presupposes that there is sense to the idea of 'Being in general' and reason to think that there is no such sense. What I want to do here is suggest one way that the account I have offered might be filled out, in particular, by sketching a way in which the discussion of authenticity in Being and Time might have been structurally significant for the above project.
1.
Phenomenology, ontology, and diversity
In Being and Time, Heidegger bemoans the baleful influence of the "priority of the present-at-hand [Vorhanden] in traditional ontology" (SZ 147), "the domination of the ontology of the 'substantial'" (SZ 320 n. xix) . He argues that we must instead 7 recognize diverse forms of Being, distinguishing, for example, Vorhandenheit from
Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand), from the mode of Being of the world within which entities of those sorts are found, and from that of the entity that encounters them in that world, Dasein. helps us "broaden the idea of objectivity," the latter "exhibited in its content in the investigation of the corresponding intuition" (HCT 72). We tend to overlook the diversity such 'intuitions'-such 'subject-correlates'-take too but, by remedying this Verstehensvergessenheit, we can expose the symbiotically-related
Seinsvergessenheit.
12
There may seem to be a circularity in this approach: one would seem to need a grasp of Zuhandenheit, for example, if one is to identify which mode of understanding of ours is our understanding of the Zuhanden. But Heidegger believes we have such a grasp anyway: "Being is never alien but always familiar, 'ours'" (MFL 147). The problem is that-in a sense-we 'forget' it. As Dasein, our mode of existence is one of "understanding Being" (SZ 12). But that understanding-which is manifest in our adept everyday dealings with the variety of entities we encounter-fails to inform our reflections on such entities and such understanding. Instead we fixate on entities possessed of a particular mode of Being-'the substantial'-and its 'subjectcorrelate'-'pure beholding'. The phenomenological response described above is a technique to aid 'recollection' of other modes of understanding and, through that, of other modes of Being. 13 An early example of this recollecting reflection in action can be found in Heidegger's lectures on St Paul and St Augustine. There Heidegger approaches "the For complications I will not discuss here that concern Heidegger's understanding of 10 how we grasp the Vorhanden, see McManus 2012: chs. 3 and 8.
Cf., e.g., IPPW 37, PRL 240, 241 etc.
11
The connection between phenomenology and ontology that I sketch here is looser 12 than that which Heidegger seems to defend in SZ. (Cf., e.g., SZ 35 and 38, and for one interpretation, see Braver, introduction to this volume.) But I will set that worry aside here.
For further discussion, see McManus 2012, sec. 1.1, and of this notion of 13 "recollection" in particular, McManus 2013c
! 4 task … to determine the sense of the objecthood of God" (PRL 67)-" [t] he sense of the Being of God" (PRL 84)-by starting "from the modes of access", from a proper appreciation of the "original region of life and performance of consciousness (or feeling), in which religion alone realizes itself as a certain form of experience" (PRL 222, 243) . By placing such a 'subject-correlate' first in our thinking, we may shake off the temptation to fall into thinking of God "by analogy with the theoretical and the constitution of the object of cognition", a temptation that distorts our "experiential comportment to God" into a "holding-as-true" and God into "simply a special object" (PRL 232, 149 In [Aristotle's] view, to be was to be something or other: for a threshold, he says, 'to be' means "to have such and such a position," for ice it means "to have solidified in such and such a way." And at the level of greatest generality, to be is to be either a substance of some sort or a relation or a quality or a member of some other category. There is no general sense to the claim that something exists over and above one of the particular senses. (Owen 1986, 181) Cf. LR x, CV 9 and TB 74 on this and the important role that Brentano's study of 16 Aristotle (Brentano 1975 ) played in revealing that question's presence to Heidegger.
McManus 2013b: sec. 3 spells out another.
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! 6
If there is no such general sense that subsumes the particulars-and hence "no class of existing things which will embrace men and miles and modesty" (Owen 1986, 216) -then "a single synoptic science of all existing things" (Owen 1986, 278) and 'being occupied with something' 'ways of understanding or grasping', or any perspective from which the difference between these entities-that such 'ways of understanding or grasping' understand or grasp-might be understood or grasped.
Polt has suggested that 'Heidegger assumes' that, although "Being takes various forms", "all the varieties of Being cohere, … so that we can ask what it means to be in general" (Polt 2005, 2) . It would be fairer to say not that Heidegger makes this assumption, but rather that he believes both that we all make this assumption-'if we conceive of philosophical cognition as something possible and necessary' (SZ 16) -and that this is an assumption to which we must show we are entitled. So how then are we to proceed? I will tentatively suggest that Heidegger employs here too the approach that Sec. 1 sketched. We saw there how Heidegger seeks to break our ontological prejudices through a phenomenological re-duction- for Dasein to be in its entirety (Fleischer 1991, 39, 196 arising from the endeavour to have the whole of Dasein completely "given".
(SZ 309).
As he puts it in HCT, that question "is the secondary difficulty":
The primary one is whether Dasein is the entity which one oneself is and which of its essence entails that it be in each case mine, and whether this entity has the possibility to be its wholeness. It is only on the basis of this possibility of being that we could have the further possibility of experiencing this self-being of Dasein in its wholeness now also in an explicit fashion.
(HCT 310-11)
The 'primary difficulty' then is establishing the sense in which Dasein can be whole, the 'secondary difficulty' being the 'methodological' question of whether we can get But when such a 'measure' "lets beings be in a particular comportment that relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole" (OET 148). Any such measure embodies "only one kind and possibility of making manifest of entities" (EP 203) and, therefore, in adopting it, one forfeits the possibility of addressing other aspects of the world. "So much for the 'revelation of beings somehow as a whole'!", one might say. But Heidegger's discussion of authenticity can be seen as pointing to a mode of existence in which we do acknowledge this whole and do so precisely by being a whole ourselves.
Reminding ourselves of the terms in which Heidegger describes inauthenticity may make this proposal-which I can no more than sketch here-seem at least a little less odd. The life of the inauthentic, let us recall, is one of "dispersal", "distraction"
and "disconnectedness" (SZ 390, 347, 371) . It is a life of "inconstancy
[Unständigkeit]", in which one is "absorbed in the everyday multiplicity and the rapid succession of that with which one is concerned", "the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one" (SZ 337, 321, 384) . In the midst of this "jumble of hovering possibilities", the inauthentic person "drift[s] back and forth between 'worldly' possibilities which it has not seized upon" (SZ 342, 344) .
At the same time though, it is a life of fixation or "falling", one in which we We may "drift" then from one mode of "losing ourselves" to the next in this "rapid succession of that with which one is concerned"; but we do so in a mode of "tranquilization" (SZ 189). It can be 'tranquil' because, in this "inconstancy"-this
Unständigkeit-we do not achieve the authentic person's "steadfastness Heidegger describes the inauthentic person's "losing himself in the object of his concern" as a "levelling off of Dasein's possibilities to what is proximally at its everyday disposal", and as "a dimming down of the possible as such" (SZ 195) . The authentic person's 'having achieved some sort of a position' may evoke a closing down of possibilities-a narrowing of view; but, in fact, as we will see below, it is in their acceptance of the need for 'some sort of a position' that we see a take on things in general emerge, an experience that one might tentatively identify with one of 'Being in general' or 'as a whole'. One might articulate this proposal in a number of ! 14 different ways and the next two sections will explore how Heidegger's discussions of 'guilt' and 'Being-towards-death' might be seen to do so.
Guilt
To return to the terms used in OET (quoted above), the adoption of one 'measure' at the exclusion of others expresses-one might say-an evaluation of "beings as a whole", in this adoption's taking one particular aspect of beings as worthy of comprehension. Indeed one faces the problem of unifying one's understanding of the world in this way whenever one acts: there may be many principled demands arising out of a situation and, when we act, we select among those demands, thereby expressing an assessment of what overall is most important. To be an actor we must condense the multi-dimensional world that we confront into a world. In doing so, we-as finite creatures-cannot avoid the possibility that the act we perform will not address all the demands that we may recognize. As a result, our existence is marked by an "ontological" or "absolute" "guilt". which-by virtue of that further depth-has a better claim to be the 'horizon' we are seeking to 'recall'.
Death and ecstatic temporality
In taking passages like WM 87 as presenting a picture of grasping 'Being as a whole', I overlooked, of course, its explicitly concerning beings as a whole; this might seem to be a prime example of Seinsvergessenheit, and my talk of the possibility of a unified 'take on things' might be seen as augmenting this confusion.
But following the clue of OET 143 and 148, I used the latter expression to refer to a unifying ranking of 'measures' and-thereby-of those aspects of things upon which one might act, the ways in which they may be. remains problematic: in particular, it is hard to establish an interpretation of such a view that gives it both substance and the necessary breadth. (2) One might think that the unity of Being concerns the unity of very broad ontological kinds rather than that of many different and particular 'measures' on which one might act. But if-contra
(1)-we can indeed act on the basis of entities being so where this is not simply a matter of their Zuhandenheit, then the unified grasp of entities being so that is necessary for action must be capable of encompassing all the different ways that such entities can be so; the 'horizon' against which entities-as understood through many different 'measures'-are projected must also be one against which the manythough presumably fewer-ontological kinds that they instantiate are projected.
Though I concentrate here on one particular notion of diachronic wholeness, I do 26 not discount the relevance of others, such as that explored in various ways in the work of Charles Guignon. Cf., e.g., Guignon 2000.
! 17 determinate acts, a refusal to be a particular person; it would be a denial of one's having a particular identity in favour of a dream of being "everywhere and nowhere" (SZ 177, 347) . Now this clearly is a dream and a 'tranquilizing' one at that;
but to see how one might come to dream it, let us note how a certain denial of death plays its part.
The thought is simple. "Freedom" is not "the choice of one possibility" and "tolerating one's not having chosen the others" if one can make up for that choice by acting on those others later; "the possibilities of action" are not "limited in 'pushing away' denies the need for a singular (unifying) response to the situation in which we find ourselves obliged to act, and the attendant 'ontological guilt' it brings with it. For such a pseudo-agent, "all doors are open"; "everything is within its reach"
as it "float[s] unattached" and "uprooted", "never dwelling anywhere" (SZ 177, 170, 173) .
In this way, inauthenticity brings with it a certain denial of one's past-of one's thrown, determinate situatedness through which one can live in only a single way-and one's future-in particular, the certain "possibility of impossibility", the possibility that one may not be able to make up for some of the choices one does not make, and the necessity that one cannot make up for all. Acknowledgement of this 'finite temporality' (SZ 348) of ours is then, in contrast, the living of life against the horizon of what Heidegger calls an "ecstatic temporality", our being "held out" into our past and finite future; when authentic, Cf. also SZ 253, 255 and HCT 315.
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! 18 the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one's closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. (SZ 338) This is the (diachronic) 'horizon' that one must deny if one is to spare oneself the 'guilt'-laden task of achieving a (synchronic) take on one's life as a whole and its "possibilities of action". Correspondingly, this is the horizon that the authentic acknowledge-live in the light of-by being-a-whole, by resisting the temptation to be the "dispersed" everyone and no-one that is the They-self. Whatever content one's take on things in general may be-whatever 'position one achieves'-this is the 'horizon' against which that such a take will be 'projected'.
There is, I think, a certain architectonic aptness to the idea that Dasein does not acknowledge Being as a whole unless it itself is-a-whole, an aptness which
Heidegger's picture of the inauthentic person as being "less than a whole" makes vivid. Such a person "clings" to particular possibilities while all others are "dimmed Elucidating that horizon-and at least part of the work that Division Three was to do was surely that-is elucidating what it is that those who live in the light of such a synchronic grasp of Being in general live in the light of, the further diachronic 'horizon' against which their distinctive form of understanding is 'projected'.
Concluding thoughts
The devil, of course, is in the detail. The above discussion is without doubt speculative, has passed at great speed over a lot of very difficult terrain, assuming a host of interpretive decisions without justification, raising as many questions as it is answers, and no doubt inviting many objections. In this last section, I will consider one such objection. Responding to it will help clarify the proposal that my discussion offers but also point to limitations we must surely encounter in attempting to confirm any proposal of this kind. Or might it? I suggested above that it is the form rather than the content of the authentic 'look' that matters. My proposal makes key one's escape from an inauthentic lostness in "the object of one's concern". One might understand this as the failure to recognize that this aspect of reality upon which one is acting is but one This might seem to leave us with a rather thin notion of 'Being in general'.
But does it? Let us recall that the horizon on to which our understanding is projected when we display a mastery of the above unity in 'ways of being' turns out to be that of a presupposed and, hence, deeper unity-that of ecstatic temporality. Is that a thin notion? Heidegger insists that "the idea of Being in general is just as far from being 'simple' as is the Being of Dasein" (SZ 196) ; and ecstatic temporality playing a key role in both would seem to confirm that.
More importantly, is the resultant idea of 'Being in general' likely to be too thin to do the work the Being and Time project requires it to do? We have a flavour of the kind of work that project was to have done in the discussion in Chapter Four of Division Two of the temporality of understanding, Befindlickeit, falling and discourse.
Heidegger offers this discussion as showing that these phenomena 'in principle cannot be clarified in terms of the "now"' (SZ 338). Rather
The ecstatical unity of temporality-that is, the unity of the "outside-of-itself" in the raptures of the future, of what has been, and of the Present-is the condition for the possibility that there can be an entity which exists as its "there". (SZ 350) He makes parallel cases concerning our "circumspective concern" with the Zuhanden and the "theoretical discovery of the Vorhanden" (SZ352, 356) . In grasping them, we "make use of time": we grasp these kinds of Being too "in their temporal constitution" (BP 291); and hence, one might see here an attempt to show that not only Dasein but these phenomena too only show themselves against the horizon of ecstatic temporality, a common horizon that provides a basis for our "calling these different ways of Being ways of Being" (BP 176, quoted above).
But any candidate concept of 'Being in general' needs to do significantly more than that. In criticising Aristotle's proposal that the question, "what is Being?", "is just the question, what is substance?" (Aristotle, Metaphysics Z 1028b4), Heidegger stresses that the "many ways" in which "Being" is "said" can be understood in narrower and wider senses. In addition to the unity that renders being Dasein, Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit 'ways of Being', we must also establish a unity that subsumes these plus Being's further "regions" of "accidental and non-accidental Being," "true and untrue Being," and "potential and actual Being" (AM 9).
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Can then the horizon that is ecstatic temporality-on a thin or yet-to-bearticulated thicker construal-deliver an account of 'Being in general' that can meet This echoes Brentano's identification of the problematic diversity to be unified as 29 that of "Being according to the figures of the categories" plus "accidental Being", "Being in the sense of being true" and "potential and actual Being" (Brentano 1975 ).
Recognition of the need to accommodate these further 'regions' gives further substance to the tentativeness of my 'first approximation' above (see sec. 7) of what 'Being in general' must subsume. But perhaps the trickiest case-of all such candidate further 'regions of Being'-is that of the Being of the 'horizon' that is ecstatic temporality. See n. 34 below.
! 22 these needs? I do not know how far one can go in resolving these matters. There also remains the task of convincing us that ontology as we know it has indeed 31 played itself out-however unwittingly or confusedly-against the background that the above account tries to identify, the task perhaps of the 'torso's' other missing parts, the three divisions that would have been Part Two. In making his claims about the horizon against which an understanding of Being in general is possible, Heidegger is also making a claim about "the basic theme of philosophy" (SZ 38)-indeed about "the inner and hidden life of the basic movement of Western philosophy" (MFL 154) -a claim which needs to demonstrate its historical plausibility.
Cf. LQT 23: "There are automobiles, Negroes, Abelian functions, Bach's fugues.
32
'Are there' truths too? Or how could it be otherwise?"
Cf. the letter to Jaspers quoted above.
